The third and final open-ended consultation on the five-year review of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was held on 7 July.Member States called for more flexible approaches to peacebuilding and a more strategic role for the PBC in the broader UN peacebuilding architecture.Speakers offered their views on how best to improve the PBC’s engagement in the field, strengthen the overall management of the Commission, and how to clarify the many roles of the PBC, especially the preventive dimension of its mandate.
Member States were particularly vocal on the question of the PBC’s engagement in peacebuilding at the country-level, especially the potential for multi-tiered engagement in the future, including options for ‘lighter’ forms of peacebuilding.
Also under discussions were the responsibilities of the PBC’s Organizational Committee (OC), and possibilities for strengthening the existing country-specific configuration (CSC) structure by potentially altering its Chairing structure.In addition, speakers debated criteria for entry and exit of PBC engagement based on flexible, context driven factors, as well as the possibility of an early warning mechanism.Finally, speakers offered their views on the analytical and coordinating capacities of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the effect of Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) allocations on the recruitment of additional PBC Agenda countries.
The discussion was guided by a final “Emerging Recommendations” paper, developed by the co-facilitators, which identified key issues and questions for the review under three clusters:
The issues were identified by the co-facilitators on the basis of informal consultations they held with relevant stakeholders since the review was officially launched in January.The clusters aim to solicit focused input and proposals from the UN membership as the co-facilitators prepare their draft report for the review.The final review paper will assess broader themes including: (i) the situation in the field; (ii) the working of the PBC at headquarters; (iii) key relationships within the UN and the outside; and (iv) the operation of the PBSO and PBF.Upon its distribution to the entire UN membership, the final review paper will subsequently be submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council for appropriate action.This process is expected to occur in late July or early August.
Multi-tiered Engagement The paper offers voice to the increasing view among Member States, that the PBC’s engagement in peacebuilding at the country-level should not be limited to the fully-fledged country-specific configuration engagement, currently underway in the four PBC agenda countries.Instead, potential Agenda countries should be offered a menu of choices for PBC commitment in their respective countries, including a ‘lighter’ form of engagement, aptly named the ‘PBC-lite’ approach, focusing on regional and sectoral gaps and focused challenges.The variety of options, referred to as ‘multi-tiered engagement’ is also a source of contention over the difficulty of oversight of such alternative forms of peacebuilding, including questions on how to best ensure meaningful engagement in countries without prescribing to uniform and practiced means.
Speakers on 7 June generally called for enhanced examination of the PBC’s engagement strategies, allowing for the possibility for multi-tiered engagement, and overall, greater flexibility in the PBC’s approach to peacebuilding.Critical to this, a number of speakers noted, is the serious consideration of the wishes and assessment of national stakeholders on the peacebuilding needs of their own country.
Bangladesh (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)), the European Union, Nigeria and others described the ideal PBC engagement as one in which the Commission approaches each country on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the contextual elements of each country’s specific peacebuilding needs.
Among their specific recommendations, Germany (as PBC Chair) and Nepal stressed that the PBC’s potential value-added to a particular country and situation must be considered in designing the PBC’s approach (including ‘PBC-lite’).
Sweden (on behalf of Nordic countries), and the United States, Indonesia, and others highlighted the importance of allowing “form to follow function” in peacebuilding pursuits.Such an approach would focus on a limited set of priorities and build upon existing national peacebuilding approaches and initiatives, instead of offering up an established “menu” of options for PBC engagement.
Countries including Canada, Japan, Cuba, Egypt, Australia, and India stressed that if a multi-tiered form of engagement is to be considered, the views and expertise of national stakeholders and domestic government must be consulted in developing an effective peacebuilding strategy.
Others, including Brazil, Nepal, Switzerland, and Peru expressed their concerns about implementing a variety of peacebuilding approaches too quickly, opting for the present, to preserve the current CSC architecture as the basic means for PBC engagement.These countries stressed that the next step for engagement is a more flexible approach, followed by future considerations of how to define multiple forms of peacebuilding engagement.
Strengthening the Organizational Committee (OC): Responsibility for all Generic Issues The paper outlined various ways to strengthen the PBC Organizational Committee.Specific to this discussion, the paper brought to light questions about the ‘lessons learned’ of the PBC – expressly the function, and added-value of the Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL), and whether or not the OC should continue the work of gathering information on the lessons learned from the PBC’s endeavors, and applying those lessons in place of the working group.
The majority of speakers called for the WGLL and the OC to continue their work in their current forms, while also recognizing a need for greater flexibility with regard to both bodies.Specifically, many Member States identified the Organizational Committee as a key body in the PBC.In the words of the Commission’s Chair, the role of the OC is “that of the custodian of the PBC’s core mandate,” while others added that the body stands as a key forum for the discussion of overarching policy and thematic questions on peacebuilding for the Commission.
Member States Canada, Brazil, and Indonesia expressed a wish that the WGLL remain operational in its current state, but that the topics under discussion within the body, should be tailored to give appropriate guidance and recommendation regarding the pertinent issues facing the PBC and current peacebuilding efforts, and that experts in appropriate fields be incorporated into the work of the Group.
Others were unsure whether the WGLL should remain in its current form.The United States remarked that as the OC should ideally focus only on one to tow issues per year, it remains unclear whether the WGLL should continue in its current form, as the entire PBC should become a learning body.Nigeria stressed that the WGLL should be working entirely for the OC and within the body as an internal source of information and review.Finally, Australia questioned whether the OC should be incorporated into the OC, as well.
Strengthening Country-Specific Configurations (CSCs): The Chairing Issue In the emerging recommendations paper, the co-chairs highlight the issue of ensuring capable Chairs of country-specific configurations. The current practice of chairing falls to Permanent Representatives based at UN headquarters in New York.Selection of Chairs is based on the individual’s experience in the high-level position as PR, the political sensitivity he or she has demonstrated and his or her access across the UN system.The paper underlines the potential for ‘widening the pool’ for recruitment of these senior representatives.Field-based (or capital-based/headquarters-based) Chairs may well bring relevant practical experience to the post and may inspire more confidence on the ground, due to a more permanent presence in the field.
Speakers were divided on the Chairing issue, voicing opposition to a proposed in-country Chairing option, or lauding the merits of such a change.Several Member States proposed a co-Chair structure, in which one CSC Chair is based in New York, while the other is capital-based, each with equal footing and voice.
NAM, Egypt, Uganda, Australia, expressed a willingness to explore the possibility of co-Chairs for CSCs.
The EU, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Peru, and Nigeria underlined the need for one chair, preferably New York-based.A stronger country-dimension and support from the ground would complement such Chairs in the future, these states noted.Germany added that role of the CSC Chair is in one regard, to offer a coordinated approach between UN headquarters and the field, and between the international community and national actors on the ground.
Criteria for Entry and Exit The need to draw up entry and exit criteria for PBC engagement was another focus of the paper.The co-chairs referred to Member States’ desire to identify the types of situations amenable to the engagement of the PBC, and the circumstances for which exit is required.On the other hand, the paper acknowledged the problems of attempting to identify such specific criteria, as they often do not incorporate the specific political context and wishes of the countries concerned.
NAM, the EU, Japan, Chile, Nepal rejected a one-size-fits all approach to exit and entry criteria for peacebuilding.Instead, peacebuilding programs should be based on the experience (and input) of each particular country – and entry and exit criteria should reflect this.
Germany, Brazil, Indonesia, added that particularly entry criteria should be based on realistic and clear assessments of the PBC’s potential added-value, and that throughout its engagement, the PBC should formulate political benchmarks to measure the progress of peacebuilding – to help with an eventual exit strategy.
The United States voiced its concern about the ‘ripeness’ of a country with regard to entry and exit criteria.The choice of the country matters tremendously in this sense, the U.S. added, and the PBC’s ability to engage quickly and effectively should be a top priority.In terms of exit criteria, the U.S. suggested that the PBC’s role be conceptualized as the bridge to a more stable future.Thus, the challenge is to create appropriate qualitative and quantitative benchmarks to measure progress made.
Nigeria described ideal exit strategies as based on the notion of setting long-term development paths, the priorities of which should be determined by national authorities, not the PBC.Early exit strategy criteria should thus reflect these long-term goals.
The UK concluded that in evaluating entry and exit criteria, Member States should avoid being overly prescriptive.However, the PBC’s engagement is likely to generate much better results where the host Government is genuinely committed to the peacebuilding process, and where a top quality and dedicated SRSG/ERSG and CSC Chair are present.
Cluster II of the paper addresses the question of the preventive dimension of the PBC’s work, and its role in this area of peacebuilding.Unclear to the co-facilitators, is the extent to which the preventive role of the PBC is stated in its existing mandate.A portion of the membership sees this role clearly stipulated in the Commission’s mandate and accepts the current scope of this role to be adequate.Others require additional clarification on this point.
The majority of Member States perceive the current mandate of the PBC, regarding its preventive role, to be sufficiently broad enough to incorporate an adequate focus on the preventive aspects of peacebuilding.
Instead of altering its mandate, several Member States, including the EU and Indonesia, made the point that the PBC’s preventive role could be strengthened through enhanced partnerships with other UN bodies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).
Other speakers, including the Chair of the PBC (Germany) stressed that the body’s preventive role should best be guided by realistic assessments of the Commission’s value-added, further aided by the willingness of the country concerned.
Brazil, and other MemberStates suggested that in the future, the PBC should engage more actively in mandated preventive role, by keeping an eye on countries not included on its agenda, and working toward an early warning mechanism.The United States and the UK added to this thought by emphasizing the need for the PBC realistically to focus its efforts on countries and places where its engagement is possible and valuable.
Japancalled the PBC’s role in this aspect of peacebuilding into question, posing the question: “Is the PBC best placed to play a preventive role in peacebuilding due to its intergovernmental structure?”
Enhanced Capacity of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) The emerging recommendations paper highlights the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) as a body within the UN’s peacebuilding architecture, vital in supporting the PBC and PBF with cross-cutting analysis of relevant issues and review of current best-practices.Faced with a view that the PBSO is not performing its mandated role to the best of its ability, the co-facilitators list the body’s problem areas.The PBSO’s analytical capacity, access to and use of experts across the UN system is lacking.In addition, the staffing of the Office is inadequate to support the PBSO in its mandated responsibilities.Finally, the paper emphasizes Member States’ concerns that the PBSO’s current position in the Secretariat does not elicit the desired attention of the UN system on crucial peacebuilding issues.
Broadly, Member States called for efforts to enhance the PBSO’s capacity and staffing, making the body capable of bringing the UN system together and enhancing its ability to absorb the significant expertise available across the system.To accomplish this, many Member States emphasized the need for more permanent core and non-core staff for the Office. As Cubastated, an enhanced staffing capacity in the PBSO would afford the Office greater clout in the decision-making processes of the UN (in matters concerning peace and security).In addition, a number of speakers made note of the need for the PBSO to enhance its relationships with other UN departments and agencies, such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN programmes on the ground, as well as with international financial institutions (IFIs) and other relevant actors outside the UN system.
The United States asserted that before the PBSO can feasibly establish a bureaucracy within the Office by increasing its permanent staff, the PBSO must establish a successful record.One way for the Office to establish this success, Peru added, could be to act to ensure that allocated funds reach their appropriate and intended destinations.
Germany’s specific recommendations for increased capacity in the PBSO included upgraded technical expertise, capacity for mapping exercises and policy guidance to the PBC.
Brazil added that the matter of staffing should be referred to the 5th committee, and should not be dealt with directly, by the PBSO.
Allocation of Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Funding: A degree of Ring Fencing? The final point of the recommendations paper deals with the allocation of PBF funding.Funding for the PBC’s activities is made through the independent decision-making of the PBF which has, in practice, allocated approximately 60% of its funds to the PBC Agenda countries.This current system is questioned by Member States as a potential incentive for vulnerable post-conflict countries to join the PBC’s Agenda, exclusively to gain access to these funds.Others are of the opinion that to leave the funding at the discretion of the PBF’s Advisory Board and the Secretariat is the most prudent manner of allocating funds.
The majority of speakers emphasized the need for the PBC and the PBF to remain separate entities, and the existing synergies between the PBF and the work of the PBC does not require formalizing this relationship any further.The PBF’s ability to decide on allocations and disburse them quickly is the most important added value of this body, many Member States added, and a degree of flexibility and a certain amount of independence must be allowed to the Secretary-General in managing the allocation of PBF funding.
Others, including NAM and Nepal called for greater involvement of the PBC, the OC and CSCs in setting the priorities for PBF funding.This could potentially be accomplished through the development of an accountability framework.
Egypt added that in the future, the PBF should consider encouraging more predictable forms of voluntary funding, as financing for peacebuilding should go beyond the PBF and engage other actors in the future, such as the private sector.In addition, given the PBF’s role as a catalytic driver for action on the ground, the priorities of resource distribution should mirror the priorities in the field.One sure way to mobilize continued additional resources for peacebuilding work is to prove the success of the PBC on the ground.
The co-facilitators will be taking the views of Member States into consideration as they enter the ultimate phase of drafting the final PBC review report.The final report will be circulated among Member States, expectedly at the end of July or early August.The report will subsequently be submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council for appropriate action.
Speaking at the meeting on 7 July were the co-facilitators (Permanent Representatives of Ireland, Mexico and South Africa), the Permanent Representative of Germany in his capacity as Chair of the PBC, and representatives of: Bangladesh (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)), the European Union (EU), Sweden (on behalf of Nordic Countries), Canada, Brazil, Japan, Chile, Indonesia, Nepal, the United States, Switzerland, Peru, Nigeria, the Netherlands, Cuba, Egypt, Uganda, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Australia, the Russian Federation, and India.
